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vABSTRACT 
This research simulates the effectiveness of an alternative auction mechanism for 
Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) that has potential for reducing the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s (DoD’s) cost.  A recent student thesis studying the application of salary 
auctions and matching in an assignment setting determined that there are two major 
complications in an assignment auction which affect the incentive of bidders to submit a 
truthful valuation of the jobs.  An alternative auction mechanism that combined elements 
of both auction theory and matching was proposed to overcome these complications.  
This study further defines this alternative auction mechanism and presents a simulation 
setup for testing the effectiveness of the mechanism.  Simulation is carried out and the 
mechanism is evaluated based on defined operational performance and efficiency 
measures.  The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the benefits of the alternative auction 
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1I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
The U.S. Navy has introduced the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) Program to 
deal with recurrent manning shortages in certain billets.  Under the AIP Program, 
selected sailors receive the monthly bonus pay they requested for the duration of their 
tours in hard-to-fill, AIP-eligible billets.  The AIP Program has been implemented using 
an auction or bidding system, which is expected to be a cost-effective means of getting 
sailors to voluntarily accept assignment to billets that are traditionally less desirable.  AIP 
rates can vary for individual billets and depend on sailors’ bidding behavior, which in 
turn is affected by sailors’ preferences and alternatives as well as the structure of the 
bidding system and its implementation. 
A recent student thesis studying the application of salary auctions and matching in 
an assignment setting determined that there are two major complications in an assignment 
auction that affect the incentive of bidders to submit a truthful valuation for the jobs.  
Firstly, because each bidder can only win one post, bidders may have an incentive to 
overstate their willingness-to-accept or reservation wage if they anticipate that the system 
must allocate them a post, particularly if the number of open posts is at or above the 
number of bidders.  Secondly, standard auction formats assume one-sided preferences in 
which bidders care about the items (in this case, assignments) for which they are bidding 
while the bid-taker (in this case, the military) has no preference over which bidders win 
the auctions.  If a sailor quality variable (reflecting the military’s assessment of the value 
that a particular sailor or type of sailor will bring to a particular assignment) is somehow 
combined with the dollar amount of each sailor’s bid to determine the winner of the 
assignment auctions, however, high quality bidders have an incentive to maximize their 
personal surplus by submitting a higher bid than their true minimum willingness-to-
accept for the assignment.   
An alternative auction mechanism that combined elements of both auction theory 
and matching was proposed to overcome these complications and potentially reduce the  
 
2U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) cost.  While the optimality of this proposed 
mechanism has been proven theoretically, it has not been tested to see if it works in 
reality.   
 
B. PURPOSE 
This study further defines the proposed alternative auction mechanism and 
presents a simulation setup for testing the effectiveness of the mechanism.  The 
mechanism will be evaluated based on defined operational performance and efficiency 
measures. 
The following research questions are addressed: 
• Does the alternative auction mechanism work? 
o In particular, does the mechanism properly assign sailors to billets 
consistently and easily? 
o Does the mechanism also determine the incentive pay amounts 
associated with each assignment consistently and easily? 
• Is the alternative auction mechanism efficient? 
• What are the benefits of the alternative auction mechanism to DoD? 
 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Scope 
The scope of this thesis includes: 
(1) a review of salary auctions for assignments in the military, 
(2) definition of the alternative auction mechanism to be tested, 
(3) simulation setup, 
(4) carrying out simulations to test the effectiveness of the mechanism, and 
(5) an evaluation of the operational performance and efficiency of the mechanism.  
3The thesis will conclude with the benefits of the alternative auction mechanism to 
DoD. 
2. Limitations 
This research is not an empirical study and does not determine whether (and by 
how much) submitted bids will vary from a sailor’s true willingness-to-accept for a 
particular assignment.  It is also outside the scope of this research to consider the 
possibility of ex-post bargaining or intervention.  The testing of the mechanism is based 
on one scenario involving an equal number of billets and sailors as well as the same 
valuation ranges.  Extended testing with alternative settings by varying the number of 
sailors and billets as well as the valuation ranges is a recommended follow-up from this 
research. 
 
D. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study will help improve knowledge and understanding of the interaction 
between auction theory and matching mechanisms as applied to assignments.  It will also 
help to determine if there is a more effective auction mechanism for Assignment 
Incentive Pay (AIP). 
 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
An overview of auction theory is covered in Chapter II.  Chapter III explains the 
application of auctions to assignments in the military.  The simulation setup and 
evaluation measures are presented in Chapter IV.  Chapter V reports the simulation 
results and provides an evaluation of the alternative auction mechanism.  Chapter VI 
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5II. AUCTION THEORY 
A. BACKGROUND 
The root word for auction is "auctio" meaning "increase".  According to the 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, an auction is “a sale of property to the highest 
bidder”1.  An economic definition will be that an auction is “a market institution with an 
explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from 
the market participants”2.    
An auction is essentially a method for transacting a commodity or resource that 
has an undetermined or variable price.  The price is determined through competition 
among buyers or sellers who bid for the right to buy or sell, with the item allocated to the 
bidder with the best offer.  Auctions can be categorized as single-object or multi-object 
auctions.  The role of information or type of valuation determines if an auction is a 
common value or independent private-values auction.  Auctions also differ in terms of 
rules specifying the roles of buyers and sellers; open as opposed to sealed bids; first-price 
as opposed to second-price payments; and the level of security or privacy among others. 
Auctions have existed for centuries, dating as far back as the Babylonian and 
Roman empires,3 and have been used to transact almost anything, ranging from antiques 
to environmental licenses.  Among the most famous auction houses in the world are 
Christie’s, Sotheby’s and Bonhams.  Auctions have also moved online with companies 
such as eBay operating global trading platforms where individuals and businesses can 




                                                 
1 “Merriam-Webster Online,” http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary (assessed October 2, 2006). 
2 R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic Literature 
Vol. XXV (June 1987), 701. 
3 Paul Klemperer, Auctions: Theory and Practice (Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 15. 
6B. KEY FEATURES 
Some key features of auctions are given below: 
1. Common Value versus Independent Private-Values Auctions 
a. Common Value Auctions 
In common value auctions, the value of the auction item is the same for 
each participant; however, different participants may have different information about the 
potential value of the item.  As an example, participants auctioning for a jar full of 
quarters may not have complete information about the true value of the jar, but the jar 
will be worth the same amount to each participant.  Asymmetric information in this case 
leads to different valuations and gives rise to the winner’s curse, in which auction 
winners “curse” their win when they realize that they won because they overestimated the 
item's value, which led them to overbid and suffer a loss.  
b. Independent Private-Values Auctions 
In independent private-values auctions, each bidder knows his/her 
personal value for the item, but he/she is uncertain about other bidders’ values, which 
differ based on taste and preference.  Each bidder’s valuation is independent of and 
unaffected by any information about others’ valuations, unlike the common value auction 
in which a bidder is likely to revise his value estimate based on other bidders’ values.  
This does not, however, preclude private-values auction bidders from changing their bids 
to gain a strategic advantage if they receive information about other bidders’ values.   
 
2. First-price versus Second-price Auctions 
a. First-price Auctions 
In first-price auctions, the highest (lowest) bidder pays (receives) the 
winning bid they submitted.     
b. Second-price Auctions 
In a second-price auction, the highest (lowest) bidder pays (receives) the 
second highest (lowest) bid rather than the one they submitted, or the first excluded bid in 
a multi-object auction.   
73. Forward versus Reverse Auctions 
a. Forward Auctions 
In a forward auction, an item is put up for sale by the seller, who is the 
bid-taker.  Multiple potential buyers are the bidders who put up increasing bids for the 
item.  The highest bidder wins the right to buy the item at a price determined when the 
bidding ends, which can be the winning bid or the second highest bid.  Forward auctions 
have been used to sell almost anything, from wives and slaves in early auctions, to 
manuscripts, antiques, agricultural produce and even corporations more currently.    
b. Reverse Auctions 
A reverse auction conversely has one buyer who is the bid-taker and many 
sellers who are the bidders submitting decreasing bids.  The right to sell is won by the 
bidder with the lowest bid and the sale price can be the winning bid or the second lowest 
bid.  Reverse auctions have been used by procurement agencies to secure supplies of a 
requested good or service from the supplier with the lowest bid to accept the contract.    
 
4. Open versus Sealed-bid Auctions 
a. Open Auctions 
An open auction is one that is conducted such that “bidders are able to 
observe their rival’s bids and accordingly, if they choose, revise their own bids”4.  Bids 
can either be announced by an auctioneer, called out by the bidders themselves or 
submitted and posted electronically.  Open forward auctions have been used to sell art 
pieces in which several potential buyers bid against one another, escalating the price until 
an eventual winner emerges with the highest bid.   
b. Sealed-bid Auctions 
In a sealed-bid auction, bidders each simultaneously submit only one 
sealed bid.  Sealed-bid auctions have been used to sell mineral rights, artwork and real 
estate.   
 
                                                 
4 R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan, “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic Literature 
Vol. XXV (June 1987), 702. 
85. Single versus Multi-Object Auctions 
a. Single-Object Auctions 
In a single-object auction, a single item is auctioned at any one time.  The 
simple single-object auction has been the focus of theoretical research for many years and 
it has been researched extensively. 
b. Multi-Object Auctions 
A multi-object auction involves auctioning several items at one time.  
Multi-object auctions have been commonly analyzed as if they were a number of 
independent single-object auctions.  However, treating multi-object auctions as 
simultaneous single-object auctions is inappropriate when the value of the item acquired 
depends on the other items the bidder acquires or does not acquire because the other 
items are either complements or substitutes.  The approximation may also be 
inappropriate “if bidders have budget restrictions, capacity constraints, or, in general, 
have non-linear utility functions”5. 
 
C. TYPES OF AUCTIONS 
There are four basic types of auctions in use: the English auction, the Dutch 
auction, the first-price sealed-bid auction, and the second-price sealed-bid auction.  Each 
of the four types of auctions will be described and analyzed in the context of a forward 
auction; however the reverse auction equivalent should be easily understood to be the 
mirror image of what will be described.   
 
1. English Auction 
The English auction is also known as the oral, open or ascending-bid auction and 
is the most commonly used auction form.  Bidders compete openly against each another, 
successively raising the price until no one is willing to bid further.  The highest bidder 
then pays the price that is equivalent to the second highest bid plus the bid increment.  
Antiques and artwork are frequently sold through English auctions. 
                                                 
5 Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Robert J. Weber, "An Example of a Multi-Object Auction Game," 
Management Science Vol. 25 No. 12 (December 1979), 1272. 
9Assuming private-values, the equilibrium strategy of bidders in a forward English 
auction is to bid up to his valuation or maximum willingness-to-pay, WTP, but no further 
regardless of what others bid.  If a participant’s final bid is lower than his maximum 
WTP, he foregoes potential economic rent, which is defined as his valuation minus price 
paid.  If his final bid is higher than his maximum WTP, he will suffer a loss.  The winner 
will be the bidder with the highest valuation who effectively pays the second highest 
valuation if the bid increment is negligible.  This auction form is thereby efficient with 
the item allocated to the bidder who values it most and truth-revealing because the 
dominant bidding strategy dictates that all bidders, with the exception of the winner, 
reveal their true valuation. 
 
2. Dutch Auction 
In the Dutch auction, also known as the descending-bid auction, the converse 
occurs, with the auctioneer or some sort of electronic device, such as a clock, calling a 
high starting price that is lowered until one bidder accepts and pays the going price.  The 
Dutch auction has been used to sell tulips in the Netherlands, fish in Israel and tobacco in 
Canada.   
Under this auction form, there is no dominant bidding strategy.  Each participant 
decides on his best bid based on his valuation and expectation of his competitors’ 
valuation and bidding strategies.  Nevertheless, it can be proven mathematically that at a 
Nash equilibrium, the decision rule for each bidder in a forward auction is to bid below 
his true valuation.  The Dutch auction is therefore not truth-revealing and unless all 
bidders have the same information (or expectations), “there is no assurance that the 
equilibrium outcome will be efficient”6, unlike the English auction that always results in 




                                                 
6 Paul Milgrom, “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer” Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 3 No.3 
(Summer 1989), 9. 
10
3. First-price Sealed-bid Auction 
Under the first-price sealed-bid auction, all participants submit bids 
simultaneously such that no one knows the bid put in by others.  In a forward auction, the 
highest bidder wins and pays the price they submitted. 
The first-price sealed-bid auction is analogous to the Dutch auction because each 
participant faces the same situation; they must decide how much to bid not knowing how 
others are going to bid and pay their own bid if they win.  The first-price sealed-bid 
auction is therefore not truth-revealing and can result in an inefficient outcome unless all 
bidders have the same information (or expectations). 
 
4. Second-price Sealed-bid Auction 
The second-price sealed-bid auction is also known as the Vickrey auction and is 
similar to the first-price sealed-bid auction except that in a forward auction, the highest 
bidder wins and pays the second highest bid rather than the one they submitted.  The 
winner therefore pays a price that is determined by others’ bids and not his bidding 
actions.  This being the case, a bidder’s dominant strategy is to “submit a bid equal to his 
true reservation price, for he then accepts all offers that are below his reservation price 
and none that are above”7.  Each bidder bids his true valuation regardless of what others 
bid.  The equilibrium outcome will be that the bidder with the highest valuation will win 
and pay the second highest valuation.  Similar to the English auction, the second-price 
sealed-bid auction is efficient and truth-revealing.   
 
D. SIGNIFICANT FACTORS FOR DETERMINING AUCTION FORMATS 
Auction design affects revenue generation and bidders’ behavior.  In particular, it 
is important to minimize the risk of collusion and entry-deterrents.  As highlighted by 
Homb (2006), there are several factors to consider when deciding on the format of an  
 
 
                                                 
7 Paul Milgrom, “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer” Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 3 No.3 
(Summer 1989), 8. 
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auction.  These include revenue generation, bidder risk tolerance, collusion, reserve price, 
private information, number of bidders and other levers as summarized in the following 
assuming a forward auction. 
 
1. Revenue Generation 
According to the Revenue-Equivalence Theorem, the English auction, the Dutch 
auction, the first-price sealed-bid auction, and the second-price sealed-bid auction each 
generates the same revenue on average assuming: 
• Risk-neutrality 
• Independent private values 
• Symmetric bidders 
• Payment is based only on bids  
The English and second-price sealed-bid auctions effectively produce the same 
revenue because the winner pays the second highest valuation as described earlier.  The 
Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auctions yield the same revenue given that they are 
identical setups.  Under the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auctions, each bidder will 
choose to bid as small a premium as possible over the second highest valuation to 
maximize his economic rent.  If all bidders are risk-neutral and symmetric, the winning 
bid will be close to the second highest valuation.   
Even under these assumptions, however, the four auction formats do not 
necessarily produce the same outcome in all situations (i.e. for all possible combinations 
of bidder valuations); they generate the same prices only on average (across any given 
prior distribution of valuations).  In addition, the theorem does not hold when the 
assumptions are violated.      
 
2. Bidder Risk Tolerance 
The extent and impact of information asymmetry differs across the four auction 
forms.  Bidders can observe their competitors’ bids and infer their valuation as well as 
12
bidding strategies in an open, ascending-bid auction like the English auction.  While this 
information is not available in the second-price sealed-bid auction, it does not affect how 
bidders choose to bid.  Conversely, in the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auctions, 
participants bid not knowing how others are going to bid, which creates uncertainty and 
increases risk. 
If bidders are risk-neutral, the increased risk does not affect their behavior under 
certain given conditions.  However, if bidders are risk-averse, they will tend to bid more 
aggressively to increase the probability of winning and reduce the level of uncertainty, 
even though this will decrease their potential economic rent.  Therefore, with risk-averse 
bidders, the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auctions will generate a higher expected 
price than the English and second-price sealed-bid auctions. 
 
3. Collusion 
Collusion allows participants to keep prices down at the expense of the seller.  
The choice of auction design affects the risk of collusion, be it overt or tacit among 
bidders.  Unlike open auctions where participants can send signals through their bids, it is 
more difficult for bidders to communicate and collude in sealed-bid auctions.  In 
addition, an auctioneer can take steps to counter collusion for example by setting a 
reserve price or excluding bidders who are known to be part of a collusion ring. 
 
4. Reserve Price 
A reserve price, which is the minimum price for which a seller is willing to sell a 
good or service in a forward auction, or the maximum price a buyer is willing to buy a 
good or service in a reverse auction, can be specified to guarantee a minimum revenue or 
maximum cost.  Reserve prices should be set carefully to ensure that they do not 
inadvertently discourage participants from bidding or result in the loss of profitable 
transactions.   
Reserve prices can be used to decrease the gains from collusion and thereby 
reduce the incentive for bidders to co-operate with each other.  The use of reserve prices 
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as a tool to prevent collusion is more common in auctions where participants can more 
easily collude, for example if the pool of potential bidders is small and they know each 
other. 
 
5. Private Information 
The auctioneer has to decide on whether and how much information should be 
disclosed to participants, which can affect their valuation.  The information may provide 
bidders knowledge of the product or service, quantity available, historical sales data or 
the competition involved.  Sellers are motivated to reveal information that influences 
bidders’ valuations upwards and increases revenue.  It is not in their interest to provide 
information that will cause bidders to revise their valuations downwards.   
In addition, information can also affect uncertainty, which impacts participants’ 
behavior.  For example, a seller can reveal information to increase uncertainty in Dutch 
and first-price sealed-bid auctions with risk-averse bidders to induce them to bid more 
aggressively and thereby generate higher expected revenues. 
 
6. Number of Bidders 
In general, an increase in the number of bidders increases the amount of 
competition and the expected revenues in the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auctions, 
because participants will tend to bid more aggressively to increase their chances of 
winning.  Bidders do not, however, change the way they bid in the English and second-
price sealed-bid auctions because their dominant strategy is to bid their valuation 
regardless of the number of competitors and what they bid. 
Uncertainty regarding the number of bidders in an auction with risk-averse 
bidders increases the expected revenue generated in the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid 
auctions.  There is no impact if bidders are risk neutral.  As explained before, uncertainty 




7. Other Levers 
There are additional levers that can be used to enhance the auction design.  First, a 
fixed and non-refundable entry fee can be charged for participation rights.  An entry fee 
can serve to keep out undesirable participants such as those who are not serious bidders 
as well as function as a reserve price by excluding buyers with low valuations.  However, 
care should be taken in setting the entry fee to ensure that it does not discourage serious 
participants and limit competition.  An entry fee may not be suitable in an assignment 
setting because individuals are likely to be put off by the non-refundable expense with no 
guarantee of any return.    
Second, a time limit for bid submission can be imposed to reduce bidders’ 
chances of researching or meeting each other and determining others’ valuation or 
bidding strategies.  Setting a time limit increases uncertainty for bidders which can lead 
them to bid more aggressively.  A time limit, however, may not be suitable in a military 
assignment auction because service members are dispersed all over the world and 
individuals may not receive information on or submit bids within a short timeframe. 
Third, a middleman can be used to represent bidders who wish to remain 
anonymous or are unable to be present at the auction.  Middlemen will need to know 
bidders’ valuation and therefore maximum bid.  It is also best to involve middlemen who 
have a good understanding of the transacted item.  In the case of a service member who 
may not be able to submit a bid given his geographic location, he can still participate in 
the assignment auction through a middleman.        
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an overview of auction theory by first describing key 
features of auctions; distinguishing between single-object and multi-object auctions, 
common value and independent private-values auctions, forward and reverse auctions, 
open and sealed-bid auctions, as well as first-price and second-price auctions.  In 
addition, the four basic auction forms (the English auction, the Dutch auction, the first-
price sealed-bid auction; and the second-price sealed-bid auction) were explained.  
Finally, several significant factors for determining auction formats were presented.   
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These factors were revenue generation, bidder risk tolerance, collusion, reserve price, 



























III. APPLICATION OF AUCTIONS FOR ASSIGNMENTS  
IN THE MILITARY 
 Auctions can be used to trade a wide variety of products and services including 
job assignments in the military.  The U.S. Navy has implemented a bidding system to 
establish the pay incentive for sailors who volunteer for billets that are traditionally less 
desirable.  There are several considerations in designing an auction in this context.  In 
addition, complications arise with the use of pure auctions, which are better resolved by 
an alternative assignment mechanism. 
 
A. AUCTION FORMAT CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASSIGNMENTS IN THE 
MILITARY 
An assignment auction typically involves auctioning several items at a time.  It is 
an independent private-values auction because service members’ valuation of a post will 
differ based on personal taste and preference. Each service member’s valuation of a 
particular billet is influenced by family circumstances and geographic bonds, educational 
qualifications, skills set and career plan among other factors.  An assignment auction will 
also by necessity be a reverse auction: The military is the one buyer or bid-taker for 
manpower services and eligible service members are the many sellers (of labor services) 
who are the bidders.  Service members compete on the pay incentive they require to 
accept a particular post and the right to be deployed is won by the member with the 
lowest bid.  
Either an open or sealed-bid auction with the final pay incentive calculated based 
on the winning bid or the second lowest bid can be used to determine assignments.  
Homb (2006) compares the four basic auction forms using five decision criteria, which 
are efficiency, cost effectiveness, equity, practicality and manipulability.  The highlights 






Economic efficiency is achieved when the joint surplus of the bid-taker and the 
winning bidder is maximized.  If the bid-taker (the military) is concerned only with 
minimizing the amount of the incentive pay and is indifferent about which bidder (service 
member) wins the auction, then the joint surplus associated with a particular assignment 
will be maximized whenever the bidder with the lowest willingness-to-accept (i.e. the 
service member willing to take the assignment for the least amount of incentive pay) wins 
the auction and receives the assignment.  Note that the joint surplus is independent of the 
actual pay incentive paid. 
English and second-price sealed-bid assignment auctions for an individual billet 
are theoretically Pareto-efficient, because the bidder with the lowest willingness-to-
accept will always win the post, given that each bidder’s dominant strategy in each 
auction is to bid his true valuation.  Unlike these auctions, an efficient equilibrium 
outcome is not guaranteed in the Dutch and the first-price sealed-bid auctions unless all 
bidders have the same information (or expectations).  However, under general conditions, 
the expected outcome is the same for all four auction forms on average, with each 
generating a winning bid approximately equal to the second lowest bid. 
Despite the theoretical underpinnings of the second-price sealed-bid auction, 
research has shown that it may not be efficient because bidders often stray from the 
dominant strategy and submit bids over their true valuation in a forward auction, or under 
their true valuation in a reverse auction.  This may be because the bidders are uninformed 
or do not understand the auction form and the resulting dominant strategy.  
  
2. Cost Effectiveness 
The cost effectiveness of the assignment auction is important to the military as it 
seeks to keep pay costs down.  All else being equal, an auction that distributes the joint 
surplus most favorably to the employer will be preferred.  Based on the Revenue-
Equivalence Theorem, the English auction, the Dutch auction, the first-price sealed-bid 
auction, and the second-price sealed-bid auction will yield the same average surplus for 
the military. 
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The Revenue-Equivalence Theorem presupposes that bidders are risk-neutral, 
however.  In the case where service members are risk averse, they will bid more 
aggressively in the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid auctions to increase their chances of 
winning, even though this decreases the pay incentive bids and transfers greater surplus 
to the employer.  Furthermore, an increase in the number of bidders increases the amount 
of competition and the expected employer surplus in the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid 
auctions because participants will tend to bid more aggressively to increase their chances 
of winning.  As such, the military will do better with the Dutch and first-price sealed-bid 
auctions if bidders are risk averse and there is a significant pool of bidders to minimize 
cost and maximize employer surplus. 
   
3. Equity 
Equity, in terms of equal pay for individuals with the same characteristics (for 
example, educational qualifications, relevant experience and years of service) doing the 
same jobs, is generally not achievable in a simple assignment auction regardless of the 
auction form chosen.  This is because the incentive pay for any individual is determined 
only by the valuations and competition within the particular auction that he/she wins,  
Therefore the incentive pay for two similar individuals can vary significantly based on 
varying valuations and levels of competition across assignments.   
 
4. Practicality 
The open auctions are more difficult to implement in an assignment setting 
because all eligible service members have to be gathered or represented to conduct the 
auction.  In contrast, the sealed-bid auctions are much easier to carry out because bidders 
only need to know the bid submission format and to submit their bids by the deadline 
specified.   
Comparing the two sealed-bid auction forms, the first-price sealed-bid auction is 
more familiar to and easier to comprehend for a first-time user because the winner is the 
one who submitted the lowest bid and will simply receive the pay incentive he bid.  The 
second-price sealed-bid auction is somewhat less familiar to most people.  Furthermore, 
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the strategic behavior requirements are less intuitive so people will find it harder to 
understand without substantial education.  On the other hand, if bidders did know the 
equilibrium bidding strategies under each auction format, implementing the second-price 
bidding strategy will be far simpler for the bidders. 
 
5. Manipulability 
An auction can be subject to manipulation by bidders who improve their personal 
results by not revealing their true valuations.  For example, groups of bidders can collude 
or individual bidders can exhibit unexpected behavior.  The risk of collusion is higher in 
the open auctions because bidders can observe competitors’ behavior and send signals 
through the bidding process.  This risk is reduced if the number of participants is large 
and bidders are not familiar with the auction format or each other.   
Besides the choice of auction form, employers can set a reserve price equal to the 
maximum WTP to fill the post to avoid overpayment.  Employers can also impose a time 
limit for bid submission and keep private information that may lead bidders to seek 
greater surplus value, such as the number of posts that the employer needs to fill.   
A bid-taker can also manipulate auction results by cheating.  For example, an 
employer can feign a second-lowest bid that is just above the lowest bid to lower salary 
costs in second-price sealed-bid auctions.  Finally, if considerations other than relative 
bids are used to determine auction winners, there may be an opportunity for bidders to 
benefit from deception, as will be explained further in the next section. 
 
B. COMPLICATIONS WITH USE OF AUCTIONS FOR ASSIGNMENTS IN 
THE MILITARY 
Based on the above considerations, it will appear that first-price sealed-bid 
auctions are the most suitable for determining assignments in the military.  Nevertheless, 
as observed by Homb (2006), there are some complications with using the first-price 
sealed-bid auction that affect the incentive of bidders to submit a truthful valuation of the 
jobs.   
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Firstly, an assignment auction is a multi-object auction and a service member can 
submit bids on more than one job.  However, unlike multi-object auctions in which 
sellers (buyers) can sell (buy) more than one item, a service member can only win one 
post, even if he is the lowest bidder for more than one post.  As such, service members 
may overstate their minimum WTA or reservation wage because they anticipate that the 
system will allocate them a post, if the number of open posts is at or above the number of 
bidders.   
Secondly, auctions assume one-sided preferences (i.e., only bidders have 
preferences).  The use of pure auctions implies that the value of the pay incentive bids is 
the only factor the employer cares about.  However, employers are also concerned with 
the quality of the assignee.  If a quality variable is included along with the bid value to 
reflect employer preferences over which employee gets which job, high quality bidders 
have an incentive to maximize their personal surplus by submitting a higher bid than their 
true valuation of the post.   
 
C. AN ALTERNATIVE AUCTION FORMAT FOR ASSIGNMENTS IN THE 
MILITARY 
Given that there are complications with the use of a pure auction mechanism, 
Homb (2006) proposed an alternative auction mechanism that combined elements of both 
auction theory and matching theory8 to overcome these complications and potentially 
reduce the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)’s cost.        
Under the proposed alternative auction mechanism, the bid-taker or employer is 
required to identify the reservation price (i.e., maximum WTP) for each post to be filled.  
Bidders or service members will be required to submit their pay incentive bid, which is 
their reservation wage or minimum WTA for each post.  Each service member may have 
multiple preferred posts, which will be reflected in his bids.   
Given this information, an attempt is made to match a post to each service 
member that maximizes his surplus, which is equal to the reservation price minus his 
                                                 
8 Matching theory focuses on the trading of multiple unique items between sellers and buyers both of 
whom have preferences over the outcomes. 
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reservation wage.  Feasible matches of posts and service members are set temporarily.  If 
there is an excess demand for posts, the reservation price is lowered and the matching 
process is repeated until a competitive equilibrium is reached with one-to-one matches of 
service members to their most preferred post under the current set of reservation prices.  
Service members are motivated to bid truthfully because the mechanism starts from each 
post’s reservation price and only adjusts it downwards if there is excess demand. 
To incorporate employer preferences, minimum qualification levels can be set for 
each post.  Where to set the minimum qualification level for each billet is an important 
consideration for the bid-taker, as the mechanism will assign no additional value to 
service members who possess additional valuable qualifications above and beyond these 
minimum qualifications.  Classifying each bidder as simply either “qualified” or “not 
qualified” to bid on a particular billet allows the auction mechanism to retain its truth-
revealing feature by only comparing pay incentive bids to determine assignments.     
This alternative auction mechanism can be interpreted as a generalization of the 
second-price sealed-bid auction.  The assignments made and the final incentive pay levels 
calculated through this mechanism are such that no service member assigned to a billet 
will prefer to be assigned to a different billet (and receive the particular incentive pay 
associated with that billet) and, moreover, no service member who is NOT assigned to 
one of the billets eligible for such incentive pay will prefer to be assigned to one of those 
billets given the final incentive pay levels.  In other words, given the final incentive pay 
levels calculated by the mechanism, each service member receives his most preferred 
assignment. Hence, the outcome of this mechanism is a “stable” matching between 
service members and billets. 
An additional appealing characteristic of the mechanism is that it is truth-
revealing for all service members.  On the negative side, some posts may go unfilled as a 
result of this mechanism, however this is likely the result of the employer either setting 
the minimum qualifications too high or the reservation price too low.  The employer may 
therefore need to review the minimum qualifications and/or reservation price for 
unmatched posts if they remain unfilled after several auctions. 
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While the mechanism induces truthful behavior from service members, there is no 
means of ensuring that the employer will likewise submit honest minimum qualifications 
or reservation prices.  As such, the employer should establish a clear set of guidelines and 
be as transparent as possible to manage employee perceptions.   
In addition, the employer should note that while this is the minimum-cost truth-
revealing mechanism, it is not necessarily the cost-minimizing mechanism because the 
mechanism starts from the reservation price and only adjusts it downwards if there is 
excess demand.  The reservation price and minimum qualification requirement therefore 
need to be set carefully to balance the probability of filling the post with the cost and 
quality of the assignment. 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the considerations in designing an auction in the military 
assignment settings, which include efficiency, cost effectiveness, equity, practicality and 
manipulability.  Based on these considerations, the first-price sealed-bid auction was 
found to be the most suitable for determining assignments in the military.  However, 
there were two major complications in an assignment auction that affect the incentive of 
bidders to submit a truthful valuation of the jobs.  Firstly, an assignment auction is a 
multi-object auction in which a service member can only win one post even if he is the 
lowest bidder for more than one post.  Secondly, an assignment auction assumes that the 
employer is only concerned about the value of the pay incentive bids and not with the 
quality of the assignment, which is not the case.   
An alternative auction mechanism that combines elements of both auction theory 
and matching theory to overcome these complications was then outlined.  This 
mechanism is truth-revealing for all service members and produces an outcome similar to 
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IV. SIMULATION AND EVALUATION OF THE  
ALTERNATIVE AUCTION FORMAT 
The alternative auction mechanism outlined in Chapter III can potentially reduce 
manpower costs for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) because it is the minimum-
cost truth-revealing mechanism.  However, the model has not been tested to see how it 
works in reality.  The following discussion further defines the proposed alternative 
auction mechanism for the U.S. Navy and presents the simulation setup for testing the 
effectiveness of the mechanism.  A separate mechanism, which is not truth-revealing for 
sailors but possibly more cost-effective, is also set up to help the Navy evaluate and 
trade-off the cost of overpaying sailors for the job against the cost of truth-revelation.  
The operational performance and efficiency measures used to evaluate the mechanisms 
are then defined. 
  
A. MODEL MODIFICATION 
The original alternative auction mechanism is based on the assumption that 
additional qualifications do not matter much if service members can meet the minimum 
qualification requirements, which is not necessarily true.  If additional qualifications 
above-and-beyond this minimum standard significantly affect employer preferences, the 
model may fall unacceptably short of maximizing total employer surplus across all 
billets.    
The employer surplus for a particular billet in the U.S. Navy can be defined as the 
value of having a sailor man the billet over and above the wage paid.  Total employer 
surplus is the sum of employer surpluses across all billets.  The value of having a sailor 
man the billet depends on the fitness or qualifications of the sailor.  To incorporate 
employer preferences fully, the employer should be required to identify the maximum 
WTP for each billet and category of sailor that can fill the billet, starting from the 




B. SIMULATION SETUP  
The modified alternative auction mechanism is tested by simulating the U.S. 
Navy auction assignment process involving 10 AIP billets and 10 sailors.  Billet values or 
maximum WTPs are randomly generated from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 
2,000 and rounded to the nearest bid increment, which is set at 50.  This range of random 
values is intended to encompass the range of actual historic monthly assignment incentive 
pay amounts, which have been observed to range from virtually nothing to as high as 
$1,700.  Sailor preferences or minimum WTAs are similarly randomly generated from a 
uniform distribution of the same range and rounded to the nearest bid increment.  The 
same range is used for sailor preferences and billet values to avoid inadvertent 
manipulation of the evaluation measures, such as billet and sailor surpluses that are 
affected by the absolute size of the WTPs and WTAs.  The range starts from zero to 
allow for the possibility that a particular sailor brings no additional value (above his base 
compensation) to a particular billet. 
Under this auction mechanism, each sailor is assigned a billet that maximizes his 
surplus given an existing set of billet AIP levels (which will differ for each sailor).  The 
initial AIP level associated with any sailor/billet combination is equal to the billet’s 
reservation price for that sailor.  Competition for a particular billet will repeatedly lower 
its AIP levels, and the assignment process does not end until there is no longer excess 
demand for any billet.  The solution generated this way is considered “sailor-optimal” 
because the mechanism starts from each billet’s reservation price and only adjusts it 
downwards if there is excess demand; sailors are thereby motivated to submit truthful 
bids.  However, the mechanism is not necessarily truth-revealing or cost-minimizing for 
the Navy. 
A separate auction mechanism can be set up such that a greater share of the 
surpluses accrues to the Navy instead of the sailors.  Under this “billet-optimal” model, 
each billet selects and is temporarily matched to the sailor providing it the highest 
surplus, which is equal to the reservation price minus the AIP level for each sailor, with 
the AIP level initially set equal to the reservation wage that the sailor specified for that 
billet.  Competition among the billets for a particular sailor raises the AIP levels for that  
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sailor and the matching process continues until a stable equilibrium is reached in which 
each billet is matched to its most preferred sailor under the current set of AIP wages 
without displacing another billet.   
Such a mechanism is truth-revealing for the Navy and possibly more cost-
effective as well, because sailor reservation wages instead of billet reservation prices 
form the starting point for the AIP wages.  However, there is no guarantee that sailors 
will submit truthful bids under this setup.  Both auction mechanisms are simulated to help 
the Navy evaluate and trade-off the cost of overpaying sailors for the job against the cost 
of truth-revelation.  The test algorithms for both models are presented below. 
 
1. Sailor-Optimal Model 
Under the sailor-optimal model, the test algorithm starts with Sailor One and 
determines his value to each billet (i.e., each billet’s maximum WTP for Sailor One).  
Sailor One’s surplus for each billet is then computed by subtracting his minimum WTA 
from the AIP level, which is initially set equal to the billet’s WTP.  The sailor is 
temporarily assigned to the billet that provides him the highest surplus and the AIP 
associated with that billet is adjusted downwards by one bid increment for all subsequent 
sailors to reflect that there is competing demand for the post.   
After Sailor One has been temporarily assigned, the algorithm moves onto Sailor 
Two and similarly determines which billet offers him the greatest surplus.  Sailor Two is 
temporarily assigned to that billet even if it happens to be the temporary assignment for 
Sailor One, who is “bumped” out of the billet and moved down the list after Sailor 10 for 
reassignment by the algorithm.  The AIP level of the billet to which Sailor Two is 
assigned is then also lowered by one bid increment for all subsequent sailors.   
The algorithm is repeated until all possible one-to-one matches of sailors to their 
most preferred post have been made and no displacement takes place under the existing 
set of AIP wages.  This final set of matches represents the optimal equilibrium 
assignments for sailors because the mechanism starts the AIP wages at the billet WTPs 
and only adjusts them downwards if there is excess demand. 
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2. Billet-Optimal Model 
Conversely, under the billet-optimal model, the test algorithm starts with Billet 
One and determines each sailor’s minimum WTA for the billet.  Billet One’s surplus is 
then computed by subtracting each sailor’s AIP wage (initially set equal to the sailor’s 
minimum WTA) from the corresponding WTP.  The sailor that provides the highest 
surplus is temporarily assigned to Billet One and the sailor’s AIP wage is adjusted 
upwards by one bid increment for all subsequent billets to reflect that there is competing 
demand for the sailor.   
After a sailor has been temporarily assigned to Billet One, the algorithm moves 
onto Billet Two and similarly determines which sailor offers the greatest surplus.  The 
sailor offering the greatest surplus is temporarily assigned to Billet Two even if it 
happens to be the same sailor who was temporarily assigned to Billet One, which will 
then become vacant again and moved down the list after Billet 10 for reassignment by the 
algorithm.  The AIP wage of the assigned sailor is then again raised by one bid increment 
for all subsequent billets.   
The algorithm is repeated until all possible one-to-one matches of billets to their 
most preferred sailor have been made and no displacement takes place under the existing 
set of AIP wages.  This final set of matches represents the optimal equilibrium 
assignments for billets because the mechanism starts the AIP wages at the sailor WTAs 
and only adjusts them upwards if there is excess demand. 
 
C. EVALUATION MEASURES 
The measures that will be used to evaluate the two auction mechanisms are 
grouped into five categories, which are overall system performance measures, sailor 
value measures, billet value measures, cost measures and quality measures.   
 
1. Overall System Performance Measures 
This category of evaluation measures is concerned with the overall operational 
performance as well as economic efficiency of the mechanism and includes the 
following:  
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a. Trial Success  
(Solution?) 
This measure considers if a solution was found for the trial within 200 
iterations of the algorithm.  It is used to evaluate the mechanism’s success in finding a 
solution. 
b. Number of Iterations  
(Rounds) 
This measure considers the number of iterations required to find a 
solution.  It is used to evaluate the mechanism’s speed in finding a solution. 
c. Percentage of Sailors Assigned  
(% of Sailors Assigned) 
This measure considers the percentage of sailors successfully assigned by 
the algorithm.  It further defines the mechanism’s success rate in finding a solution. 
d. Percentage of Billets Filled 
(% of Billets Filled) 
This measure considers the percentage of billets successfully filled by the 
algorithm.  Similar to the Percentage of Sailors Assigned measure, it further defines the 
mechanism’s success rate in finding a solution. 
e. Ratio of Average Total Surplus Attained to Upper Bound of 
Distribution Range for WTP Values  
(Avg Total Surplus/UB) 
This measure considers the average total surplus attained as a proportion 
of the upper bound of the distribution range for WTP values.  It is used to evaluate the 
average total surplus attained under the mechanism normalized by the maximum possible 
WTP for any sailor.  The average total surplus attained is equal to the average of the 
difference between the matched billet’s original reservation price and the assigned 




f. Ratio of Total Surplus Attained to Maximum Total Surplus 
Attainable  
(Total Surplus (Current Model)/ Total Surplus (LP)) 
This measure considers the total surplus attained under the mechanism as 
a proportion of the maximum total surplus attainable given the WTA and WTP values 
generated for the trial.  It is used to evaluate the economic efficiency of the mechanism.  
The maximum total surplus attainable is calculated using a linear programming model, 
which is described in the Appendix, to determine the assignment of sailors to billets that 
maximizes total surplus.   
 
2. Sailor Value Measures 
This category of measures assesses the value generated by the mechanism for 
sailors and includes the following: 
a. Ratio of Average Sailor Surplus to Average Total Surplus 
Attained  
(Avg Sailor Surplus/Avg Total Surplus) 
This measure considers the average surplus generated for sailors as a 
proportion of the average total surplus attained.  It is used to evaluate the average share of 
the total surplus available that accrues to the sailors.  The average sailor surplus is equal 
to the average of the difference between the assigned sailor’s AIP for the matched billet 
and his original reservation wage. 
b. Ratio of Average Sailor Surplus to Upper Bound of Distribution 
Range for WTP Values  
(Avg Sailor Surplus/UB) 
This measure considers the average surplus generated for sailors as a 
proportion of the upper bound of the distribution range for WTP values.  It is used to 
evaluate the average sailor surplus produced by the mechanism normalized by the 




c. Ratio of Average Sailor Surplus to Average AIP  
(Avg Sailor Surplus/Avg AIP) 
This measure considers the average surplus generated for sailors as a 
proportion of the average AIP.  It is used to evaluate the average sailor surplus produced 
by the mechanism normalized by the average wage payment.  It indicates how much of 
the AIP wage that sailors receive is surplus enjoyed by the sailor as opposed to 
opportunity cost incurred as a result of serving in a less appealing billet.   
 
3. Billet Value Measures 
This category of measures assesses the value generated by the mechanism for 
billets and includes the following: 
a. Ratio of Average Billet Surplus to Average Total Surplus 
Attained  
(Avg Billet Surplus/Avg Total Surplus) 
This measure considers the average surplus generated for billets as a 
proportion of the average total surplus attained.  It is used to evaluate the share of the 
total surplus available that accrues to the billets.  The average billet surplus is equal to the 
average of the difference between the matched billet’s original reservation price and the 
assigned sailor’s AIP. 
b. Ratio of Average Billet Surplus to Upper Bound of Distribution 
Range for WTP Values  
(Avg Billet Surplus/UB) 
This measure considers the average surplus generated for billets as a 
proportion of the upper bound of the distribution range for WTP values.  It is used to 
evaluate the average billet surplus produced by the mechanism normalized by the 
maximum possible WTP for any sailor. 
c. Ratio of Average Billet Surplus to Average WTP  
(Avg Billet Surplus/Avg WTP) 
This measure considers the average surplus generated for billets as a 
proportion of the average WTP.  It is used to evaluate the average billet surplus produced 
by the mechanism normalized by the average maximum payment billets are willing to 
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make.  It indicates how much of the value that a sailor brings to a position is actually 
captured or enjoyed by the billet (or Navy) relative to how much of this value is offset by 
AIP wages paid for the sailor’s services.   
 
4. Cost Measures 
This category of evaluation measures is concerned with the manpower costs 
incurred by the Navy and includes the following: 
a. Ratio of Average AIP to Upper Bound of Distribution Range for 
WTP Values  
(Avg AIP/UB) 
This measure considers the average AIP cost as a proportion of the upper 
bound of the distribution range for WTP values.  It is used to evaluate the average wage 
payment generated by the mechanism normalized by the maximum possible WTP for any 
sailor. 
b. Average Ratio of AIP to WTP  
(Avg (AIP/WTP)) 
This measure considers the average of the ratio of the assigned sailor’s 
AIP to the matched billet’s WTP.  It is used to evaluate the average size of the wage 
payment as a proportion of the matched billet’s WTP for the assigned sailor. 
c. Ratio of Average AIP under Mechanism to Average AIP under 
Least-cost Sailor Model  
(Avg AIP (Current Model)/Avg AIP (Billet-Optimal, all WTPs = 
UB)) 
The desire to focus solely on controlling costs can lead the Navy to 
minimize the wage bill by assigning the least-cost sailor to each billet.  However, it is 
generally not possible to do so unless sailors’ true reservation wages are known.  
Alternatively, the Navy can require billets to select the least-cost sailor as their preferred 
choice.  The solution set for this scenario is analogous to the results of the billet-optimal 
model in which all billet WTPs equal the upper bound of the range = 2,000.  Under this 
model, each billet is temporarily matched to the sailor with the lowest WTA.  
Competition for any sailor raises that sailor’s reservation wages and ultimately the 
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lowest-cost sailor is assigned to each billet.  The model will be truth-revealing even for 
sailors because billets are not concerned with the quality of the assignee given that billets 
have the same WTP for all sailors.  
This measure considers the average AIP cost under the mechanism as a 
proportion of the average AIP cost under the least-cost sailor model.  It is used to 
evaluate the average wage payment generated by the mechanism normalized by the 
average wage payment resulting when each billet adopts the least-cost sailor selection 
policy. 
 
5. Quality Measures 
This category of evaluation measures is concerned with the quality of the 
assignees as measured by the WTP values and includes the following: 
a. Ratio of Average WTP to Upper Bound of Distribution Range for 
WTP Values  
(Avg WTP/UB) 
This measure considers the average WTP as a proportion of the upper 
bound of the distribution range for WTP values.  It is used to evaluate the average 
assignee quality generated by the mechanism normalized by the maximum quality 
possible. 
b. Average Ratio of WTP to Max WTP  
(Avg (WTP/Max WTP)) 
This measure considers the average of the ratio of the matched billet’s 
WTP for the assignee to that billet’s maximum WTP.  It is used to evaluate the average 
level of the assignee quality as a proportion of the quality of the most qualified sailor. 
c. Ratio of Average WTP under Mechanism to Average WTP under 
Most Qualified Sailor Model  
(Avg WTP (Current Model)/Avg WTP (Sailor-Optimal Model, all 
WTAs = 0)) 
The U.S. Navy can theoretically be prepared to pay all costs to equip each 
billet with the sailor most qualified for the job.  This scenario can be simulated using the 
sailor-optimal model in which all WTAs = 0.  Under this model, each sailor is 
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temporarily assigned to the billet that values him most highly i.e. the billet for which he is 
most qualified.  Competition for any billet lowers that billet’s reservation prices and 
ultimately the sailor most qualified for the job is assigned to each billet.   
This measure considers the average WTP under the mechanism as a 
proportion of the average WTP under the most qualified sailor model.  It is used to 
evaluate the average assignee quality generated by the mechanism normalized by the 
average assignee quality attained under a policy of matching the most-qualified sailor to 
the job. 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter explained the modification made to the alternative auction 
mechanism and described the simulation set-up that involved developing the test 
algorithm for two models, the sailor-optimal model and the billet-optimal model, to help 
the Navy evaluate and trade-off the cost of overpaying sailors for the job against the cost 
of truth-revelation.  The measures that will be used to evaluate the models were then 
presented, which include overall system performance measures, sailor value measures, 
billet value measures, cost measures and quality measures.   
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V. RESULTS AND EVALUATION  
A pilot run of the simulation set-up described in the previous chapter generated 
100 trials for a preliminary analysis.  Based on the preliminary analysis, the mechanisms 
did not always result in the most efficient allocation.  Further analysis and testing were 
conducted to determine the source of inefficiency.  An additional 1,000 trials were 
generated for the full analysis.  The simulation results are summarized below.   
  
A. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The simulation results for the 100 trials generated are as follows:    
1. 100 Trials 
a. Overall System Performance Measures 
Table 1 presents the overall system performance measures for the two 
auction mechanisms, the Sailor-Optimal Model and the Billet-Optimal Model, averaged 
across the 100 trials generated. 
Table 1.   Overall System Performance Measures (100 Trials). 
Models Overall System Performance 
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Avg Total Surplus / UB 55.86% 
[41.39% , 71.11%] 
55.92% 
[41.67% , 71.11%] 
Total Surplus (Current Model) / 





* The minimum and maximum values observed are reflected in parentheses as [Min, Max].   
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Both models produced a feasible solution with a match rate of at least 90% 
for each trial9.  The Billet-Optimal Model yielded a solution more quickly on average.  
The average match rate was about the same for the two models – the Billet-Optimal 
Model produced a 100% match rate in 54 of the 100 trials as compared to 55 trials under 
the Sailor-Optimal Model.   
The same set of sailor assignments was produced in 71 trials.  Of the 
remaining 29 trials, the same total surplus was generated in 10 trials.  The Billet-Optimal 
Model yielded a higher total surplus in 11 trials, resulting in a marginally higher ratio of 
average total surplus attained to the upper bound of the distribution range for WTP 
values.  The average total surplus attained in either model was about 56% of the 
maximum possible WTP for any sailor.  Neither model generated an efficient solution in 
all 100 trials, but the Billet-Optimal Model came closer to doing so.  The extent to which 
the solution deviated from the maximum total surplus attainable was small with both 
models, producing solutions that were at least 97% as efficient as those under the linear 
program.  This inefficiency may be partly due to the choice of the bid increment and will 
be investigated in the next section. 
b. Sailor Value Measures  
The sailor value measures are shown in Table 2.  The Sailor-Optimal 
Model generated greater value for sailors as expected.  Over 70% of the average total 
surplus went to sailors under the Sailor-Optimal Model, three times that under the Billet-
Optimal Model.  Under the Sailor-Optimal Model, the average sailor surplus constituted 
about 40% of the maximum possible WTP for any sailor as compared to less than 15% 
for the Billet-Optimal Model.  The average sailor surplus comprised 65% and 37% of the 





                                                 
9 The match rate is sometimes less than 100% to allow for unmatched sailors and billets at the end of 
the process whereby none of the billets that are unmatched will have a WTP that is greater than the WTA 
of any of the unmatched sailors.   
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Table 2.   Sailor Value Measures (100 Trials). 
Models Sailor Value 
Measures Sailor-Optimal  Billet-Optimal  
Avg Sailor Surplus / 
Avg Total Surplus 
73.39% 
[46.02% , 99.60%] 
24.15% 
[4.02% , 56.67%] 
Avg Sailor Surplus / 
UB 
41.12% 
[22.50% , 62.50%] 
13.39% 
[2.22% , 29.25%] 
Avg Sailor Surplus / 
Avg AIP 
64.55% 
[43.89% , 82.55%] 
36.63% 
[9.57% , 66.10%] 
* The minimum and maximum values observed are reflected in parentheses as [Min, Max]. 
c. Billet Value Measures  
The value measures for billets are given in Table 3.  As expected, the 
Billet-Optimal Model generated greater value for billets.  Over 75% of the average total 
surplus went to billets and the average billet surplus constituted about 43% of the 
maximum possible WTP for any sailor, almost three times that under the Sailor-Optimal 
Model.  The average billet surplus comprised 55% of the average maximum payment 
billets were willing to make under the Billet-Optimal Model as compared to 19% under 
the Sailor-Optimal Model.  
Table 3.   Billet Value Measures (100 Trials). 
Models Billet Value 
Measures Sailor-Optimal  Billet-Optimal  
Avg Billet Surplus / 
Avg Total Surplus 
26.61% 
[0.40% , 53.98%] 
75.85% 
[43.33% , 95.98%] 
Avg Billet Surplus / 
UB 
14.74% 
[0.25% , 33.61%] 
42.53% 
[18.06% , 61.94%] 
Avg Billet Surplus / 
Avg WTP 
18.93% 
[0.30% , 40.33%] 
54.60% 
[23.64% , 75.20%] 
* The minimum and maximum values observed are reflected in parentheses as [Min, Max].   
d. Cost Measures  
In addition to the billet surplus, the U.S. Navy will be concerned with the 
total cost of AIP wages, which is presented in Table 4.  The average wage payment was 
significantly higher under the Sailor-Optimal Model, constituting over 60% of the 




Model.  The average size of the wage payment as a proportion of the matched billet’s 
WTP for the assigned sailor was 45% and 81% under the Billet-Optimal Model and the 
Sailor-Optimal Model respectively.   
As compared to the least-cost sailor model, the average AIP cost under the 
Billet-Optimal Model was about 165% higher10 while that under the Sailor-Optimal 
Model was almost 300% higher.  The cost of truth revelation on the part of service 
members ranged from 50 - 240%11 of the average wage payment resulting when each 
billet adopts the least-cost sailor selection policy.  The cost savings from not overpaying 
sailors will need to at least match this for the Sailor-Optimal Model to be as cost-
effective as the Billet-Optimal Model. 
Table 4.   Cost Measures (100 Trials). 
Models Cost Measures 
Sailor-Optimal  Billet-Optimal  
Avg AIP / UB 63.31% 
[44.17% , 83.25%] 
35.30% 
[17.50% , 58.33%] 
Avg (AIP / WTP) 81.07% 
[59.67% , 99.70%] 
45.40% 
[24.80% , 76.36%] 
Avg AIP (Current Model) / Avg AIP 




[58.65% , 391.03%] 
* The minimum and maximum values observed are reflected in parentheses as [Min, Max].   
e. Quality Measures  
The quality measures are comparable for the two models, as shown in 
Table 5.  The average assignee quality generated by both mechanisms was 78% of the 
maximum quality possible and 91% of the average assignee quality under the most 
                                                 
10 There were 12 cases where the Billet-Optimal Model produced a lower average AIP cost than the 
least-cost sailor model although two-thirds of these cases were within 92% of the average AIP cost 
generated under the least-cost sailor model.  These cases show that even as billets try to minimize the wage 
bill by selecting the least-cost sailor, instances may arise where billets end up competing for the same 
sailors and raising the average AIP cost more than if each billet were to uniquely select the best sailor based 
on both cost and quality attributes.     
11 This range is derived by subtracting the minimum average AIP cost as compared to the least-cost 
sailor model for the billet-optimal model from that for the sailor-optimal model (112.03% - 58.65% ≈ 50%) 
and by subtracting the maximum average AIP cost as compared to the least-cost sailor model for the billet-
optimal model from that for the sailor-optimal model (632.65% - 391.03% ≈ 240%).  The sailor-optimal 
model is truth-revealing for all service members but incurs a higher average AIP cost.  
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qualified sailor model12.  On average, billets were filled with well-qualified sailors above 
the 85th percentile among available sailors.   
Table 5.   Quality Measures (100 Trials). 
Models Quality Measures 
Sailor-Optimal  Billet-Optimal  
Avg WTP / UB 78.05% 
[64.25% , 89.17%] 
77.83% 
[64.25% , 89.17%] 
Avg (WTP / Max WTP) 85.76% 
[71.70% , 96.65%] 
85.62% 
[71.70% , 96.01%] 
Avg WTP (Current Model) / Avg WTP 
(Sailor-Optimal Model, all WTAs = 0)
90.76% 
[76.25% , 103.98%] 
90.50% 
[76.25% , 103.98%] 
* The minimum and maximum values observed are reflected in parentheses as [Min, Max].   
 
2. Changing the Bid Increment 
The outcome of the sailor-optimal and billet-optimal models may depend on the 
order in which sailors and billets are assigned.  There may be ex-post renegotiation 
opportunities (which require both sides being better off).  However, if the wages 
generated under these models are close to the equilibrium wages obtained under a more 
exact auction mechanism, the outcome of these models will be or come close to one 
where there are no ex-post renegotiation opportunities.  Demange, Gale and Sotomayor 
(1986) examined two progressive auction mechanisms, an “exact auction mechanism” 
and an “approximate auction mechanism”, and proved that the prices generated by the 
former are the minimum equilibrium prices (in a forward auction, such as our billet-
optimal model) while those obtained under the latter will differ from the minimum 
equilibrium prices by at most the product of the bid increment and the maximum number 
of possible matches.  As such, by making the bid increment sufficiently small, the wages 
obtained under the sailor-optimal and billet-optimal models will approach the equilibrium 
wages required to ensure there are no ex-post renegotiation opportunities.       
The bid increment was set at 50 for the trials to be consistent with the current AIP 
bid amount as well as for computational ease.  To investigate the impact of the bid 
                                                 
12 The average assignee quality under either mechanism was higher than that under the most qualified 
sailor model in some trials.  This may reflect the fact that the most qualified sailor model is conditioned on 
a 100% match rate, which adds an additional problem constraint.    
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increment for the 20 trials in which either of the mechanisms failed to generate an 
efficient solution, the bid increment was lowered to 4 so that the product of the bid 
increment and the maximum number of possible assignments was less than 50 (4 x 10 = 
40).  An additional 800 iterations were added to ensure that a solution was obtained for 
both models.    
Table 6 presents the results.  With the bid increment lowered, an efficient solution 
was obtained for a quarter of the trials in which an inefficient solution was initially 
produced by the Sailor-Optimal Model.  The total number of trials (out of 100) that were 
efficient with the lower bid increment was 92.  The new average efficiency was 99.91%.  
An efficient solution was generated in only 10% of the trials in which an inefficient 
solution was initially produced by the Billet-Optimal Model.  The total number of trials 
(out of 100) that were efficient with the lower bid increment was also 92 and the new 
average efficiency similarly was 99.91%.  The total surplus was unchanged in 70% and 
85% of the trials under the Sailor-Optimal Model and Billet-Optimal Model, respectively.  
The results show that the choice of the bid increment does affect the reflected economic 
efficiency of either mechanism; however neither mechanism can be considered an 
efficient algorithm per se. 
Table 6.   Impact of Lowering the Bid Increment     
Total Surplus Models 
Unchanged Improved Maximized 
Sailor-Optimal 14 (70%) 1 (5%) 5 (25%) 
Billet-Optimal 17 (85%) 1 (5%) 2 (10%) 
* The percentage breakdown is reflected in parentheses.     
 
3. 1,000 Trials 
The simulation results for the additional 1,000 trials generated are as follows: 
a. Overall System Performance Measures 
The overall system performance measures (excluding the economic 
efficiency measure) averaged across the 1,000 trials for both the sailor-optimal and billet-
optimal models are shown in Table 7.  A feasible solution was obtained 100% of the time 
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at about the same rate under both models.  The match rate ranged from 70% - 100%13 
and the average match rate was about the same for both models.  The average total 
surplus attained in either model was about 57% of the maximum possible WTP for any 
sailor. 
Table 7.   Overall System Performance Measures (1,000 Trials). 
Models Overall System Performance 
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Avg Total Surplus/UB 56.58% 
[38.61% , 78.33%] 
56.65% 
[38.61% , 78.33%] 
* The minimum and maximum values observed are reflected in parentheses as [Min, Max].   
b. Sailor Value Measures 
Table 8 presents the value measures for sailors.  Greater value was 
generated for sailors by the Sailor-Optimal Model, about three times that produced by the 
Billet-Optimal Model.  Although almost 75% of the average total surplus went to sailors 
under the Sailor-Optimal Model, there were instances where sailors received a lower 
proportion of the surplus, as low as 28%.  As a proportion of the maximum possible WTP 
for any sailor, the average sailor surplus came to 42% under the Sailor-Optimal Model as 
compared to 14% for the Billet-Optimal Model.  The average sailor surplus constituted 
over 65% of the average wage payment under the Sailor-Optimal Model, 27 percentage 




                                                 
13 The match rate is sometimes less than 100% to allow for unmatched sailors and billets at the end of 
the process whereby none of the billets that are unmatched will have a WTP that is greater than the WTA 
of any of the unmatched sailors. 
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Table 8.   Sailor Value Measures (1,000 Trials). 
Models Sailor Value 
Measures Sailor-Optimal  Billet-Optimal  
Avg Sailor Surplus / 
Avg Total Surplus 
74.29% 
[27.67% , 98.76%] 
25.61% 
[0% , 66.48%] 
Avg Sailor Surplus / 
UB 
42.13% 
[15.83% , 67.22%] 
14.42% 
[0% , 41.39%] 
Avg Sailor Surplus / 
Avg AIP 
65.54% 
[34.75% , 88.97%] 
38.32% 
[0% , 78.83%] 
* The minimum and maximum values observed are reflected in parentheses as [Min, Max].   
c. Billet Value Measures 
The value measures for billets are provided in Table 9.  The Billet-
Optimal Model generated greater value for billets with just under 75% of the average 
total surplus going to billets as compared to 26% under the Sailor-Optimal Model.  Under 
the Billet-Optimal Model, the average billet surplus was over 40% of the maximum 
possible WTP for any sailor and over half of the average actual WTP for any sailor, 
almost three times the value of the measures under the Sailor-Optimal Model.   
Table 9.   Billet Value Measures (1,000 Trials). 
Models Billet Value 
Measures Sailor-Optimal  Billet-Optimal  
Avg Billet Surplus / 
Avg Total Surplus 
25.71% 
[1.24% , 72.33%] 
74.39% 
[33.52% , 100.00%] 
Avg Billet Surplus / 
UB 
14.45% 
[0.75% , 44.69%] 
42.23% 
[16.94% , 68.75%] 
Avg Billet Surplus / 
Avg WTP 
18.51% 
[0.89% , 54.58%] 
53.80% 
[23.19% , 81.31%] 
* The minimum and maximum values observed are reflected in parentheses as [Min, Max]. 
d. Cost Measures 
The cost measures for both models are given in Table 10.  Under the 
Sailor-Optimal Model, the average wage payment constituted 64% of the maximum 
possible WTP for any sailor, 28 percentage points higher than that under the Billet-
Optimal Model.  The average size of the wage payment as a proportion of the matched 
billet’s WTP for the assigned sailor was 46% and 81% under the Billet-Optimal Model 
and the Sailor-Optimal Model, respectively.  The average AIP cost as compared to the 
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least-cost sailor model is more than 300% higher under the Sailor-Optimal Model and 
about 170% higher under the Billet-Optimal Model.    
Table 10.   Cost Measures (1,000 Trials). 
Models Cost Measures 
Sailor-Optimal  Billet-Optimal  
Avg AIP / UB 63.95% 
[35.83% , 86.25%] 
36.23% 
[14.25% , 60.75%] 
Avg (AIP / WTP) 81.49% 
[45.42% , 99.11%] 
46.20% 
[18.69% , 76.81%] 
Avg AIP (Current Model) / Avg AIP 




[48.28% , 576.47%] 
* The minimum and maximum values observed are reflected in parentheses as [Min, Max]. 
e. Quality Measures 
Table 11 shows the quality measures.  The average assignee quality under either 
mechanism was 78% of the maximum quality possible and 91% of the average assignee 
quality under the most qualified sailor model.  Billets were filled with well-qualified 
sailors ranking above the 85th percentile among available sailors on average for both 
models.  This similarity in terms of quality may be due to the fact that both models assign 
sailors to billets based on the total surplus possible (adjusting for competition) and high 
total surplus for a match requires both high WTP (quality) and low WTA.   
Table 11.   Quality Measures (1,000 Trials). 
Models Quality Measures 
Sailor-Optimal  Billet-Optimal  
Avg WTP / UB 78.40% 
[57.75% , 92.81%] 
78.46% 
[59.25% , 92.81%] 
Avg (WTP / Max WTP) 85.74% 
[65.32% , 99.35%] 
85.81% 
[65.17%, 99.35%] 
Avg WTP (Current Model) / Avg WTP 
(Sailor-Optimal Model, all WTAs = 0)
90.59% 
[69.54% , 107.80%] 
90.66% 
[70.75% , 107.80%] 
* The minimum and maximum values observed are reflected in parentheses as [Min, Max].   
 
B. EVALUATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE AUCTION MECHANISM 
The results generated by the Sailor-Optimal Model were comparable to those 
under the Billet-Optimal Model where overall system performance and quality are 
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concerned.  Both mechanisms are flexible enough to allow for unmatched sailors and 
billets at the end of the process whereby none of the billets that are unmatched will have 
a WTP that is greater than the WTA of any of the unmatched sailors.  In other words, no 
mutually beneficial match can take place among the sailors and billets that are left over.  
This is in line with the philosophy of the AIP program which is not to force sailors 
unwillingly into these unappealing billets, and the billets certainly will not want a sailor 
who has more cost than value.  Furthermore, each sailor and billet is eligible for several 
assignment iterations, so a small number of unmatched sailors and billets in one iteration 
may not be a significant issue.  A dynamic model can examine how many iterations it 
will take to ensure an acceptable probability that any particular sailor or billet is matched, 
but that is for future research.  Neither mechanism can be considered an efficient 
algorithm per se, although the extent to which the obtained solution deviated from the 
optimal solution was small; both models produced solutions that were over 99% efficient 
on average.   
As can be expected, the Sailor-Optimal Model works to the advantage of sailors 
while the Billet-Optimal Model works in favor of the billets.  The Sailor-Optimal Model 
(Billet-Optimal Model) generated a value up to three times greater than that under the 
alternative model for sailors (billets).  The average sailor surplus constituted about two-
thirds of the average wage payment under the Sailor-Optimal Model, 1.7 times that under 
the Billet-Optimal Model.  Billets were able to save over half of the average maximum 
payment they were willing to make under the Billet-Optimal Model, as compared to 
under a fifth with the Sailor-Optimal Model.  In terms of cost, the average wage payment 
was more than 1.7 times higher under the Sailor-Optimal Model, as compared to the 
Billet-Optimal Model, regardless of how it is normalized.   
The preceding analysis is premised on the submission of truthful valuations by 
sailors and billets.  Under the Sailor-Optimal Model, the initial AIP levels for a billet are 
set equal to the WTP of that billet for each sailor.  These AIP levels are only “bid down” 
when there are multiple sailors who find that particular billet to be the most attractive 
assignment at any particular stage of the mechanism.  Thus, under the Sailor-Optimal 
model, sailors have no incentive to misrepresent their true WTA for each billet, because 
submitting a higher than honest WTA (in a misguided attempt to raise the AIP wage), 
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will have no effect on the initial AIP levels and can only cause the mechanism to assign 
the deceptive sailor to a billet that is not his best option.  A sailor who deceptively raises 
his submitted WTA in the Sailor-Optimal model can, in fact, reduce competition for a 
billet, and thus indeed produce a higher AIP level for that billet; however this is only 
achieved by taking this deceptive sailor out of competition for that billet.  In other words, 
a sailor can use deception to produce higher AIP levels for a billet (or billets), but can 
only do so for billets to which he will not be assigned (while he is instead assigned to a 
less attractive billet).  Thus, it is always in a sailor’s best interest to truthfully report his 
WTA for each billet in the Sailor-Optimal model. 
On the other hand, it is possible for the Sailor-Optimal model to not be truth-
revealing for billets.  This can only occur, however, if a billet knows in advance the 
minimum AIP wage that different sailors are willing-to-accept to be assigned to that 
billet.  If a billet had such information about sailor WTAs (and also knew where its own 
WTP for sailors stood relative to other billet WTPs), there are scenarios in which a billet 
can theoretically increase its own surplus by lowering its bid for a sailor or sailors who 
were known to prefer that billet.  This sort of “manipulation” by billets in the Sailor-
Optimal model presents little worry, however, because it seems quite unlikely that a billet 
will have such good information about sailor WTAs (as well as about the WTPs of other 
billets).   
By a symmetric argument, it can be shown that the Billet-Optimal Model, 
conversely, is truth-revealing for billets but possibly not for sailors, given that the 
mechanism is set up to favor the billets.  A sailor who knows that he was a billet’s only or 
preferred choice and that his WTA for that billet was also relatively low can conceivably 
maximize his personal surplus by submitting a higher bid than his true valuation of the 
post. 
Comparing the two models in terms of truth revelation, it can be argued that it is 
more likely for sailors to know billet preferences than for billets to accurately guess sailor 




in a limited number of billets.  As such, the Sailor-Optimal Model may be more 
incentive-compatible overall and thereby more truth-revealing than the Billet-Optimal 
Model.   
Given that the Sailor-Optimal Model is more costly but more truth-revealing 
overall than the Billet-Optimal Model, the Navy will need to weigh the potential cost 
savings from not overpaying sailors against the cost of truth revelation, and determine if 
the Sailor-Optimal Model is more cost-effective.  This requires an empirical study or 
laboratory experimentation to determine if and how much sailors might game a billet-
optimal mechanism. 
 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter reported the simulation results for a preliminary 100 trials, which 
encompassed overall system performance, sailor value, billet value, cost and quality 
measures.  It was observed that neither the Sailor-Optimal Model nor the Billet-Optimal 
Model generated an efficient solution all the time.  Further analysis and testing were 
conducted by changing the bid increment.  Results showed that neither mechanism can be 
considered an efficient algorithm per se.  The full analysis, based on an additional 1,000 
trials was then presented.  Finally, the proposed alternative auction mechanism was 




VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. SUMMARY 
This research focused on an alternative auction mechanism proposed by Homb 
(2006), which combined elements of both auction theory and matching, to overcome 
complications in an assignment auction that affect the incentive of bidders to submit a 
truthful valuation of the jobs.  The mechanism was further defined to fully incorporate 
employer preferences by requiring each billet to specify the maximum WTP for each 
category of sailor that can fill the billet, starting from the category with the lowest 
acceptable qualifications.  This helps reduce the incentive for sailors to maximize their 
personal surplus by submitting a higher bid than their true valuation. 
The modified alternative auction mechanism, the Sailor-Optimal Model, was 
tested to see if it works in reality by simulating the U.S. Navy auction assignment process 
involving 10 AIP billets and 10 sailors.  A separate mechanism, the Billet-Optimal 
Model, which is not truth-revealing for sailors but possibly more cost-effective, was also 
set up to help the Navy evaluate and trade-off the cost of overpaying sailors for the job 
against the cost of truth-revelation.  The simulation setup involved developing test 
algorithms for both models.  Five categories of measures were proposed to evaluate the 
two mechanisms.  These include overall system performance, sailor value, billet value, 
cost and quality measures. 
100 trials were generated for a preliminary analysis.  Results showed that the two 
models did not always generate the same set of sailor assignments or the same total 
surplus.  However, they were close in terms of total surplus and were almost 100% 
efficient.  Further analysis and testing indicated that part of the inefficiency was due to 
the choice of the bid increment; however, neither mechanism is a 100% efficient 
algorithm even after adjusting for the bid increment.     
For the full analysis, an additional 1,000 trials were generated.  In terms of overall 
system performance and quality, the Sailor-Optimal Model was found to be comparable 
to the Billet-Optimal Model.  A feasible solution was obtained 100% of the time and 
relatively quickly.  The match rate ranged from 70% - 100%; the average match rate was 
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over 95%.  The average total surplus attained in either model was about 57% of the 
maximum possible WTP for any sailor.  On average, assignee quality was 78% of the 
maximum quality possible and 91% of the assignee quality attained under a policy of 
matching the most-qualified sailor to the job.  Both models filled billets with well-
qualified sailors, above the 85th percentile.   
Due to the setup of the models, the Sailor-Optimal Model produced sailor value 
up to three times greater than the Billet-Optimal Model, and vice versa.  The average 
sailor surplus constituted about two-thirds of the average AIP wage under the Sailor-
Optimal Model, 1.7 times that under the Billet-Optimal Model.  Billets had to pay sailors, 
on average, less than half of their value to the billet (WTP) under the Billet-Optimal 
Model, but more than 80% of their value under the Sailor-Optimal Model.  The Sailor-
Optimal Model is more costly for the Navy with the average wage payment over 1.7 
times higher as compared to the Billet-Optimal Model, regardless of how it is 
normalized.   
Although the Sailor-Optimal Model is more costly, it is also likely to be more 
incentive-compatible and thereby more truth-revealing for both sailors and billets than 
the Billet-Optimal Model.  This reflects that it is more likely for sailors to know billet 
preferences than for billets to accurately guess sailor preferences. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The modified alternative auction mechanism was found to be viable; it produced a 
feasible solution consistently and easily.  Although it was not efficient per se, the extent 
of economic inefficiency is small and the mechanism did generate an equilibrium 
solution in which sailors all prefer their final assignment over all others while billets are 
basically indifferent among all sailors given the final assignments and AIP levels.  The 
mechanism worked well, generating an average match rate of over 95% and filling billets 
with well-qualified sailors above the 85th percentile on average.  Billets retained, on 
average, almost a fifth of the value that the assigned sailor brought to the post.  Under the 
mechanism, the average sailor surplus constituted about two-thirds of the average wage 
payment.  The mechanism was relatively more costly for the Navy as compared to one set 
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up to shift surpluses to the Navy instead of the sailors, but it holds the advantage of being 
overall more incentive-compatible and thereby more truth-revealing.   
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several areas of follow-up from this research.  First, an empirical study 
using laboratory experiments can be conducted to determine if sailors and billets 
understand how to use the mechanism as well as whether and to what extent they will 
engage in gaming or deception.  Second, ex-post bargaining can be incorporated into the 
model to analyze the economic efficiency of the mechanism.  Third, the mechanism can 
be further tested using alternative settings by varying the number of sailors and billets 
and the valuation (WTA/WTP) ranges.  Fourth, only varying billet WTP levels across 
groupings or categories of sailors, based on rank and other standardized qualifications, 
rather than varying WTP across all individual sailors, will perhaps provide a better 
simulation of how billets will actually report their WTP levels if this mechanism were to 
be implemented.  Finally, perhaps additional modifications to the mechanism can be 
explored that will retain the truth-revealing advantage of the sailor-optimal model while 
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APPENDIX.  LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODEL 
The setup of the linear programming model to determine the assignment of sailors 
to billets that maximizes total surplus is presented below.  
The decision variables are the assignments of sailors to billets, Xij.  Xij = 1 when 
sailor i is assigned to billet j and Xij = 0 when sailor i is not assigned to billet j.  The 
objective function is to maximize the total surplus, which is the sum of the surplus values 
for sailor-billet matches, where the surplus value is defined as the difference between the 
matched billet’s WTP for the assigned sailor and that sailor’s WTA for that billet.  
Besides the non-negativity constraint, the other constraints are that no sailor can be 
assigned to more than one billet and no billet can be matched to more than one sailor.  
The mathematical formulation of the linear programming model is as follows: 
Max 
jiX ,  
subject to 
      for i = 1, 2, …, 10  
      for j = 1, 2, …, 10 
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